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Hammer  tries  to derive  price and rationing  rules  uncertainty  and insurance.  But if the research  he
for public  health facilities.  He highlights  the  calls for in this paper is pursued,  those issues
effect on these rules of different assumptions  must figure  prominently  as major  determinants
about  the objectives  of government  (health  in the demand  for care. This need was originally
versus welfare),  the limits of available  policy  identified  by Arrow, and there is still a long way
instruments,  and the market  environment  in  to go.
which the public system  operates.
Hammer's analysis  is not done in terms  of
One recurrent  Anding:  Policy  reform  must be  "preventive"  or "curative"  care, and he argues
assessed  in relation  to the changes  it induces  for assessing  interventions  on the basis of
relative  to the status quo before reform.  This  changes  in the stated objectives  of a public
point  may seem obvious,  but it represents  a  system.  But there could  well be a connection
distir.t gap in the literature  on resource  with the preventive-curative  dichotomy  if there
allocation  in health.  were reason to believe  that preventive  care will
systematically  lose out to curative  care in a
To assess changes,  the behavior  of the  market setting.  On the basis  of people's gener-
private sector  must be known  in the type of care  ally acknowledged  undervaluation  of preventive
given in a system and on how this care will  services,  this may well be the case.
change  in response  to the policy. Substituting  for
a reasonably  well-functioning  private sector  is  Other prevention  activities  also have  many
not as valuable  as providing  services  that the  "public  good" features,  with few  private altema-
private  sector cannot  be expected  to sustain.  tives,  and will look good when improvements
over status quo are examined  for all interven-
Research  is needed to characterize  market  tions. But all activities  must be evaluated  in
equilibrium  for medical care and its response  to  their  improvement  over market  provision.  It is
policy measures.  Hammer  could not examine  not necessary  to prejudge  the case for certain
many issues  - most important,  those related  to  types of intevention.
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0.  Introdgction
Providers of health care in public clinics in the developing  world work under circumstances  in
which the demands  placed upon them  are beyond  the resources  they have  available  to them. This requ;res
that choices  have to be made in order to get the most out of their limited budgets. One response  to this
inability  to serve all clients for all conditions  would be the adoption  of protocols or rules which ration
the range of services available in the public health service.  The criteria for such a choice would,
naturally, depend on how much health one could buy for a given budget.  A second possibie response
is to try to recover costs in the form of user charges which could then be used to stretch the budget
allocation with the supplementary  funds.  This comes, of course, at the risk of deterring people,
particularly poor people, from the use of desired and effective  services.
This paper attempts  to formulate  ways  to analyze  the impact  on various objectives  of pricing and
rationing decisions  within a public system. It attempts  to show that decisions  will in general depend  on
a wide range of factors both under the control of the health authorities  and not.  These factors are:
1) the nature of the objective  of the government.  Is the goal to improve health per se or to
improve a more general notion of "welfare"?
2) the nature of demand for health services in the public sector and of both demand and supply
(and market equilibrium)  in the private sector (or other alternatives  to the public system).
3) whose budget  is being allocated. Are the resources of the Ministry  of Health  the only relevant
ones?  The government  as a whole? The entire economy?- 2 -
4) the range and flexibility  of policy instruments  the government  has at its disposal. Constraints
on the use of some policies, such as the inability to charge at different rates for individual
treatments  in the public  sector or to charge at all need to be considered.  Similarly,  can  the private
sector be regulated  or must its behavior  be regarded as a given by the authorities?
One candidate for a criterion on which to base the rationing decision which appears in the
lterature has been the cost-effectiveness  of interventions. This decision  rule implies that the amount of
some unit of output (lives  saved or, as in a recent World Bank study, discounted  healthy life years') per
dollar spent on the intervention  is calculated  and the activities  with the highest ratios be undertaken. If
correctly measured, this criteria is clearly the proper one by definition. However, the proper measure
of this concept  depends on dhe  factors  just listed and these are not usually  included  in its calculati'n. One
aim of the paper is to  show under what conditions these commonly calculated versions of cost-
effectfiveness  of medical and public health procedures provides an adequate  guide to decision-making.
As  will be  demonstrated, the conditions are  so restrictive as  to  be  usable in  only very  special
circumstances. A further goal of the paper is to identify  the types of information  which do need to be
collected in order to make correct public health decisions.
The type of questions which are addressed in the first section of this paper are limited to the
treatment of people who voluntarily  show up at public health facilities,  the prices charged them and the
range of disease conditions the health authorities  choose to treat.  The objective is assumed to be the
improvement  in health status and the budget is that of the Ministry of Health.  Various assumptions
concerning  the private sector are then made. Broader issues (and in the context of developing  countries,
very possibly the more important issues) such as the extent of the network of health facilities, the
provision of public health measures such as safe water, sanitation  or vector control, the regulation of
private providers or public information  campaigns  designed  either to change lifestyles and habits or to
increase  demand for services  in public clinics  are handled  in section  2.  In section  three, the broader class
of problems in which welfare rather than  health status is the objective will be examined.  This
formulation  overcomes  many of the problems which arise in the first two sections.  Since much of the
basic analytics  for this case are standard  in the literature of project evaluation  and generally  transfer to
'Dean  Jamison  and Henry  Mosley  (eds.),(forthcoming),  Disease  Control  Priorities  in Developing  Countries.-3-
issues of health, tho discussion  will focus on a few areas in which the health sector requires special
handling.
The method is to specify a particular form or family of forms of objectives  the government is
assumed to want to pursue, the constraints  under which it must act (primarily  a budget for the ministry
of health) and varying forms of policy interventions  available to it.  For the purposes of this paper, the
latter are limited to prices which may be charged for publicly provided services (whether  specific to
disease conditions or not) and a rule concerning which disease conditions may be treated in public
facilities. Rules by which  the appropriate  pricing  and treatment  criteria may be selected  are then derived:
those rules which best further the social goals may then be characterized. The problem is set forth in its
most general form to begin  with and then subsequeintly  made  simpler  to capture  particular  policy  contexts.
Except for the initial description of the problem to be solved, the paper is written with little
mathematics in the main text which summarizes the main results without the details of the formal
argument. The appendices  derive the results and discuss  the nature of the solution in more detail.
1.  Health as the Objective
The government  wishes  to run its public clinics in such a way as to get the greatest improvement
in health status possible for a given amount of money  to be devoted to it.  For the time being, health
improvement  is the only goal, other components  of the government's objective  will be mentioned  in the
final section of the paper.  The full range of interventions  by disease  to be considered  is known: there
are N possible disease conditions  and interventions  indexed by i.  The health centers do no active case
finding though they may do outreach in the form of follow up for certain disease conditions.  The
improvement  in health outcome is dependent  on the number of people who show up for a given disease
condition  and the effectiveness  of treatment currently available. Each of the treatments entail a known
cost and the total number of people treated is limited  by a given budget. The health center can charge
for services, thereby relaxing this constraint  on the budget. Whether the fees can be levied at different
levels for different disease conditions  is a complication  to be dealt with in the following  section.  The
health center can also decide not to treat a particular condition  (if, for example, it is too expensive  and-4-
will lead to too rapid a depletion of the budget available). The government is not the only provider of
health services (though  the case  of a government  monopoly  is examined  in the following  section as well).
The private sector, non-governmental  (usually  non-profit)  organizations,  traditional healers or self care
by the afflicted  person can all substitute  for the provisiun of services in the public facilities.
A formulation  of the problem which reflects the above considerations  can be written:
N
maximize  L  =  [L 1 (D 4 (P 5
8,P, 1)) * 1,  +  LI'(D,  (P  PI J1))J
subject to:  r  (C,' - P,)  *  D,'(P,',P,) *  I,  s  R
Where:L1  = Health improvement  in people visiting sector  j a= B (public)  or V (private))
with condition  i
DI  =  Number of people visiting  sector j with condition  i
P1  = Price charged for treating condition  i in sector  j
Ii  = A variable which indicates  whether condition i is treated  by the public clinic
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
CB  =  Unit cost of treatment for service i by the public clinic
R  =  Total public budget  for health care
The first line sets out the main objective  of the government, which in this case is to maximize
health status, L,  Jf the population  through policies related to the public health care system.  Whether
health status is improved by public or private practitioners is not a concern in and of itself.  Other
possible objectives  of the government  such as improving  the income  distribution, or increasing  welfare
in dimensions  other than improving health status are ruled out at this point but are picked up in the
extensions  to the model.  Ignoring other objectives  of government  can be shown to have unacceptable-5-
consequences  but will be done in the first pass through the pr-hlem.
The second line is the budget constraint for the public health system.  Total subsidies (the
difference between  costs of provision and the price charged for the service for each timo the service is
used summed across all services  provided)  cannot exceed the total resources, R, available  to the public
health service. This is not the budget constraint  for the whole gove. in.ent nor for the society as a whole
and itts  use can also lead to unacceptable  results.  However, this could well be the constraint that the
Minister  of Health finds the most relevant. The consequences  of taking this narrow a view of the social
welfare and social costs will be discussed  below.
The demand for public services DB()  depends on prices in both the public and private sector.
Demand is written as being for a particular disease condition, i, ho;. ever, this needs to be interpreted
with some care.  The individual  is not assumed  to know the cause of her illness, and demand is really
a function  of symptoms  rather than of disease. However,  tnderlying the demand relation as expressed
here is an unexpressed  relation  linking  disease  conditions  to demand  for services. This is captured  in full
generality  by having demand functions  which are specific to disease  i and which can vary according  to
the usual severity of symptoms and the likelihood  to seek help when they appear.  The demand for
services will bear a relationship  to the incidence  of the disease  to the extent that specific symptoms  are
more or less likely to induce a search for care.  Schistosomiasis  may go undetected  ar.d so have a large
gap between incidence and demand for treatment.  Illnesses with more severe symptoms will have a
closer connection  between incidence  and demand.
The  degree of substitutability between the public and  private sectors is  captured by  the
responsiveness  of demand to their respective  prices. High own and cross price elasticities  reflect  a great
degree of substitution. Other determinants  of demand, particularly .ncome, are held constant for this
analysis. Explicit recognition  of demand by different  groups for either ethical valuation  of outcomes  or
in describing the pattern of use of public and private sectors is left to the conciuding  comments.
The health improvement  function LAB(-)  in the public sector can be in terms of lives saved or
healthy life years saved conditional  on someone  with condition  i showing up for treatment.  The same-6-
sort of function L,&-)  applies in the private sector.  This can be the same function  or can reflect quality
differences  in the two sectors.  In a country  with a well functioning  public sector with very little private
modem care, the treatment outside public clinics could be mostly very poor care by traditional  healers
or self care. In other settings, a sophisticated  private sector  may exist (with the possibility  that treatment
is more effective in the private sector than in the public, Liv() >  L,(-), for certain illnesses)  or, for
psychosomatic  culturally dete; .ined illnesses, even the traditional sector may exhibit this property.
Health improvo.jent due to treating  a condition  (i.e., the functions, L1v(  )) will sometimes  be considered
simply proportional  to the number  of people being treated for the condition, i.e., the marginal benefits
to treating any given condition once someone  has already presented with symptoms may not vary with
the number seeking treatment. This assumption  could fail to be true if the more severely afflicted are
more prone to seek treatment at any level of prices and health improvement  from treatment varies with
severity.
Costs of treatment  in the public sector, Cf  , will be assumed  in the following  to be constant  for
each treatment.  Treatment costs should include the costs of all diagnostic tests needed to identify an
eligible  disease and its treatmert.  To some extent, then, costs could  be attributable  to diseases  which are
not covered by the health service if they take up diagnostic  or other resources before the ineligibility  is
discovered. This effect is assumed  to be small. Other issues  raised by the form of the cost function  are
similarly assumed away.  In particular, joint costs and scale economies or  diseconomies are .not
considered. This is a potentially serious limitation  in practical application  since most policy decisions
will involve packages of services wnose complementarity  may well determine  the appropriate  choices.
Having a certain piece of equipment  with multiple uses in place may make some treatments worthwhile
which otherwise would not be ,ustitied and would not alone justify the purchase  of the equipment.
The price in the public sector is determinied  within  the problem  as a matter of policy. Different
degrees of specificity  of this price are assumed  below. In the most general case, a separate charge may
be given for each condition.  However, this degree of flexibility in the pricing structure may be
impossible  and therefore, various constraints  on the allowable  price rules can be examined. The price
in the private sector is not subject to direct control by the government. Two versions of private price
determination  are possible.  In one the price in the private sector is given and unaffected  by either the-7-
price charged or the inclusion  of the disease in the protocols  of the public sector.  The other possibility
is that either of these two policies can have an effect on the price charged (and thus a secondary  effect
on total demand) in the private sector.  A careful analysis  of the connection  of the piivate sector price
and performance as influenced by policies within public clinics is beyond the scope of this paper,
however, the basic  point point that private sector  behav!ir may tue  influenced  by competition  on price and
rationing rules in the public sector is captured in a simple way in what follows.
The other policy parameter is the indicator  l; which takes on the value I if the service is given
in the public clinic  and fo  if it is not.  For the simplest  analysis  in the paper, peoples' demand for services
is independent  of the range of services  offered  by the public sector. However, it is possible  that .f certain
services are not provided, this lack of comprehensiveness  may discourage  people from using the public
sector even when  they have conditions  which wyizJ"  be treated. People's demand  is determined  primarily
by symptoms and not the actual disease condition  and thus the possibility  of being turned away from
treatment will not be known  to the person when treatment is originally  sought.
Solution  with Condition-Specific  CharMes. The maximization  problem described above can be
solved by examining  the effect of changes  in the prices chiarged  for different services and the choice of
services to provide on the overall objective.  The health indicator is maximized when two sets of
equations  are satisfied: those corresponding  to the prices, Pf's,  and to the set of diseases  to include in
the public health service, I's.  The derivation  of these equations  are described  in appendix  1.
The main results are the following:
-Interventions  should  be chosen which  lead to the greatest improvement  in health relative  to what
is being  done for the same disease condition  outside  the public sector.
- This relative improvement  must be assessed in comparison with the budget impav' of the
intervention  when the price for the service is set correctly  not relative  to the resource cost of the
- The net health impact depends on the manner in which private markets respond to policy- 8 -
changes  In the public sector: pricing and rationing  rules depend  on the degree of competition  in
the private sector.
- Prices should be set which balance  two competing  ends: limiting the adverse, net (of private
sector response) health effect of a reduction in use.  of the particular service and increasing  the
revenue that allows more services to be provided.
The point is to stretch the public budget  as far as it can go in achieving  health gains.  if a service
of comparable  quality is readily available  and used in the private sector, either it should  be left to private
practitioners to handle.  At least, should not absorb much public subsidy, i.e.,  its price In the pubiic
sector should be closer to costs.  Conditions in which many people will be dissuaded from getting
effective  treatment, in either sector, when higher prices  are charged in the public sector should, sensibly,
have lower prices.  On the revenue side, the more inelastic is demand, the higher the price which can
be charged  without affecting  health status, saving money  that can be used to extend services  (or increase
the subsidy)  for other ailments.
A few comments  in explanation  and interpretation  are in order.  Some of these results are quite
standard in optimal  pricing theory and are discussed  in greater detail  in Besley (1988)  and in Barnum  and
Kutzin (forthcoming). The innovation  here is to link the problem with the rationing of services and
specialize the problem to the decision of the Ministry of Health rather than addressing the broader
question  of improving  overall  societal  well-being. This perspective  runs into a few very serious problems
as discussed below but mirrors the particular interest of health decisionmakers.  The main contribution
is to underscore the central role of demand and other aspects of market behavior in the setting of
priorities and prices within the public sector.
As far as the choice of interventions  to include in the public health service is concerned, the
interaction  with the optimal  pricing problem complicates  the interpretation  of the result.  In one sense,
the flexibility  afforded  by this very general  problem (as far as being  able to charge  separately  for different
services is concerned) makes the choice of which services to provide much less interesting.  If, for
example, the public sector does no better than the private for some particular condition  and draws all its
clients from the private sector, one could argue that the service should not be provided publicly.However, if fses can recover the costs of provision, then there is no budgetary impact  of providing  the
service (there is no net cost) and it does not really matter  whether it is provided or not.  In this case, it
is possible that there will be no condition  under which l; is zero, i.e., all diseases  are treated as long as
the public sector can do as well as the private on technical  grounds. Full cost could be charged for all
services which would )therwise  be proscribed. This would have no effect on the budget and therefore
have no cost associated  with it.  Cases below in which there are added, more realistic, constraints  on the
j.iicing policies, will make the choice of service a more substantive  problem.
There are two ways in which  private response is captured  in this formulation. The first, which
v  ;an attribute mostly to the demand side, is the choice by consumers  to switch between providers at
given  prices. This leads  to the appropriate  health improvement  being  measured  by the difference  between
the medical  outcomes in the public and private sector weighted  by the change in use of each sector due
to price changes  or rationing rules.  The second, which can be attributed  more to the supply side (or to
market equilibrium  taking both supply and demand into account) is the possible endogenous  change in
the private sector price as a result of the pricing and rationing  rules within  the public sector. If the public
sector decides  to provide a service at subsidized  prices, it becomes  harder for private nroviders  to charge
much higher rates.  If the sector were competitive,  this would result in private doctors going out of
business and is ambiguous  in its social contribution. If, as is commonly  acknowledged,  the sector is
anything  but competitive  and exhibits  elements  of monopoly  or more complex  equilibrium  conditions,  the
reduced price (or even the full marginal cost) could lead to  reductions in the private sector price
(inclusive  of market distortions)  as well and may have a second  round effect of increasing  service use in
both the public and private spheres.
Pricing needs to balance  competing  needs.  On the one hand, higher prices discourage  users of
health facilities. They could  lead to a substitution  to an inadequate  private sector (especially  if dominated
by self-care or ineffective  traditional  healers) and they may have an indirect effect of increasing  prices
and thus discouraging  use in a modern  private sector. On the other hand, the increase in revenue raised
by increasing  prices can help relieve  the budget  constraint  facing  the Ministry. While this obviously  does
not expand the treatment of the disease whose price is being raised, it can help in the expansion of
services (or, more importantly in this most general case, the reduction of prices) for other disease
conditions.- 10-
The pricing  rules presented  above  allow  for the possibility  that certain  services  may actually  make
money for the ministry, that is, the appropriate  fee could be gUdater  than the cost of provision. This is
most likely to happen under the following  conditions: 1) demand for the service in the public sector is
very Inelastic  since, in this case, increases in fees have little impact  on health status and have maximal
impact  on revenue generation,  2) cross elasticities  w;th the private sector are high and the private sector
is at least as effective  than the public. The:e are, of course, limits to how high the cross price elasticity
can be with a low own-price  elasticity.
Finally, the connection  with often-suggested  cost-effectiveness  analysis  can be drawn. In standard
formulations,  the effectiveness  of the technique  is compared  to the resource  cost and thos with high ratios,
L,/C;, are to be offered. While sometimes  suggested  that this method be used in allocating  resources in
the public sector, it appears  to bear little relation to the solution  presented  here.  Unrelated  to the choice
of public or private provision or to price policy issues, the ratio LI/C 1 appears nowhere in the solution
as such. The gain relevant  in these calculations  is the one net of private response (L 1' - L 1v) and the cost
which is relevant is the change in net subsidy  when prices are flexible  and depends both on the per unit
subsidy  (C 1-P.) and the change  in use of public facilities  (the number of units which must be subsidized).
To the extent that cost-effectiveness  is supposed  to answer a broader question  of social allocations  (not
confined to  the public sector and not dependent on Minstry budgets) this comparison may not be
completely  relevant. Comparisons  with different specifications  of the problem are dealt with below.
2.  Simplifications  and Extensions
Free Public Provision. In this section, the first of two variants of the general model discussed
above is presented.  In this case, rather than being able to charge any price and distinguish  such prices
by type of service, the extreme  opposite  assumption  is examined:  that of not being able to charge  any fees
at all but rather having to fund the entire Ministry of Health expenditure  out of a fixed budget.  This
version of the model puts the rationing rules into greater relief since any activity in the public sector is
a drain on government  funds and therefore on the total health package  which can be offered to the public.
This in contrast  to the case above  where even "frivolous"  ( yielding  little change  in health status) activities
could be provided if they were charged at full cost.- 11 -
In this caso, equation 1 is changed to remove all terms P1' from the problem and the budget
constraint  becomes:
E  C,'  D,8(0,P,) *  *, sr R
Since there are no public prices to solve for, the solution is in terms of the decision to include or not
include a particular treatments of a disease condition in the set offered.  The appropriate  decision rule
(derived in appendix  2) has the following  characteristics:
- A treatment should be offered for free in the public sector if the ratio of the net gain in health
status (net of substitution  from the private sector) to costs exceed a certain cut-off level.  The
cutoff level depends on the overall size of the budget.
-The substitution  from the private sector  should  take into  account  any price changes  in that sector
that the existence  of free public care induces.
The decision rule is the same as ranking  each of the treatments according to net improvement
ove,r  status au  per dollar spent and exhausting  the budget in that order.  The relevant  private demand
to consider  should include  the induced  effect on prices in the private sector. The inclusion  of a treatment
in the public domain  can have two effects  on private  provision. First, it is likely  to substitute  for services
since many people will find it more attractive  to get free care than pay (to the extent that they can
recognize  an illness as being treatable in public clinics).  On the other hand, the increased competitive
pressure from the public sector may lead to a fall in the private prices and a net increase in service will
result from the combination  of free public care and a reduced  price  Jr private care.
A further simplification  from this point is instructive. If in addition to the assumption  that all
care in the public sector is free, we assume that there is no private sector'  and we assume that the
technology  is linear in that the health indicator  is a constant  times the number  of people seeking  treatment
2 or that  treatment  in the  private  sector  is useless  (LS(-)  =  0 for  all conditions)  ar that  whether  or not a service
is offered  in the  public  sector  has no effect  on private  demand  for that  service.- 12  -
(a fairly innocuous  assumption  in this particular  context),  then the decision  rule is to calculate  simple  cost
effectiveness  ratios, rank interventions  in that order and do them until the budget is exhausted. Note that
it is only when all of these assumptions  are met that this decision  rule is appropriate  and only in the case
where the total society's health care (or useful health care if the private sector exists but is useless and
only exists due to extreme ignorance  of the population)  is provided  out of an arbitrary  buu(,et. Even with
all these assumptions  there is a serious problem in applying  the cost-effectiveness  ratios. Implicit  in this
problem is society's valuation  of life (or health)  which is the effectiveness  per dollar of the least attractive
procedure included. It is certainly  possible  that people's own evaluation  of  their own life could  be quite
different from this number. This would indicate (if people's valuation  were higher thai that implicit in
the Ministry's budget) that while the ministry might be doing the best it can with the budget  R, society
could do much better in terms of health and welfare than the monopoly  position of the government
allows.  People with higher valuation  of their own health status would want to pay more for services
which are not allowed by  this allocation mechanism.  Since there is  no place in  which personal
preferences affect this allocation, serious inefficiency  can result.
Uniform User Fees.  In this case, the assumption  that prices charged in the public sector can
differ by disease is again abandoned  but rather than having  free care, there can be a common  fee for all
disease  conditions  (or certain  classes of conditions). The common  fee is then a matter  of policy as well. 3
The solution  to this problem is derived in appendix  equation 2.4.
The results as presented in the appendix are a bit cumbersome but can be interpreted quite
intuitively. Start  from a situation in which the general problem  is solved for a single  service (the average
of all services).  That solution will, as in the general case, have a higher price for the service if the
elasticity  of demand is low taking private supply into account. Taking the fact that this demand is made
up of many different services, the uniform  price should depend  on the type of illnesses  whose  treatments
are most discouraged  by a higher price.  If the kinds of illnesses  which fail to be treated (in either the
public or the private sectors) due to an increase  of the common  price have effective  treatments  available
leading to big improvements  in health, this would argue for limiting those increases.  If the ailments
which are discouraged  by a price increase  happen  to be those for which  treatments  are not very effective,
3A similar analysis with somewhat  more aggregate  disease  groups is done by Musgrove  (1986).- 13 -
the price can be raised more in order to extend  treatments where they are more effective. Similarly, if
people happen to be dissuaded  from using particularly  expensive  treatments (holding  their effectiveness
constant), this too argues for higher prices (since there will be greater savings which can be used to
extend services). The relevant piece of information  is the covariance  between the elasticity of demand
for public service and the marginal effectiveness  (or cost) across treatments.
All of this is relative to the degree to which treatments  are picked up by the private sector. The
common  price can be higher, the higher  is the covariance  between  the cross  price elasticiy  of demand  for
private services  and the effectiveness  of those services. If a higher  price disproportionately  pushes  people
into the private sector for treatments which private providers are good at giving, that price should be
higher than it would be if it pushes  people with eminently  treatable conditions  (in the public sector)  into
the hands of unqualified  private practitioners  (traditional  healers or self care). If patients happen  to sort
themselves out .. n ways helpful to the public service (i.e. they know when the public service is most
useful or, by luck, they stop using expensive  services),  the price can be higher. For the most part, this
is an entirely empirical question  based on how informed  the public is, or cultural  patterns or luck.  To
some extent, though, one might expect  the term corresponding  to the cost to mitigate  against  higher  prices
since  the gap between  private and public  prices is likely to be higher  for the expensive  treatments  (private
practitioners will be charging  closer to costs) than for cheap and the demand change in the public sector
is likely, therefore, to be greater for the cheaper services  than for the expensive. 4
The rationing rule which corresponds  to the uniform  price case is not different  in form from the
previous sections. With a single  price, the rationing  rule does have real consequences  as in the free care
case since prices cannot be raised on individual  services to cover less effective or more expensive
treatments.  The higher the price charged, the more services can be provided.  Improved sorting of
This  emphasis  on covariances  between  elasticities  and costs  or effects  parallels  results  in the optimal  tax
literature. When  taxes  assessed  on commodities  are calculated  taking  the  effects  on different  income  groups  into
account,  the tax rates on each commodity  are modified  according  to the covariance  of income  shares  of that
commodity  by different  income  groups  and  the  marginal  social  valuation  of income  going  to that  group  (presumably
higher  for the  poor). This results  in lower  taxes  on items  disproportionately  consumed  by the  poor (see  Feldstein
(1972)).  The  objective  function  examined  here  is not sensitive  to distributional  concems  (since  it is hard,  ethically,
to distinguish  between  health  outcomes  per se by income  group)  and is best left to the section  on welfare. If it
were, however,  this aspect  of the standard  results  would  apply:  those  treatments  which  disproportionately  go to the
poor would  have lower  prices.  Or, in the case with uniform  fees, the common  price will be lower  if diseases
afflicting  poor people  are disproportionately  included  in the package  of provided  services.- 14 -
people (i.e., lower covariances  between service reduction and relative effectiveness  in public facilities)
can stretch the public health subsidy further.
The appropriate  price, and simultaneously  the appropriate  choice  of treatments  to offer, depends
on the behavior of people and will vary by area.  Some studies have examined  the pattern of service use
before and after price increases. There appears  to be a wide variety in this pattern with quite essential
services  being reduced in some areas (see Bennett  (1989)  for Lesotho)  while more appropriate  selectivity
(i.e., less use of less effective  services)  occurs in others (see Gertler and Melnick  (1993) on Indonesia).
This indicates that the type of price increase and the types of  services offered needs to take into
consideration  features  of the demand (and supply)  structure of the medical  services  market which are not
routinely examined. These features are:
1) own and cross price elasticities  of demand for public and private services.
2) the private sector response to public sector price and rationing policies.
3) covariances  between  elasticities  of demand and the costs and effectiveness  (again relative to
the private sector) of treatments
Public Health Interventions. The above framework can be  modified to handle public health
initiatives  which do not rely upon a clinic-based  delivery system. Vector  control (killing  disease-bearing
pests), information,  education  and communications  (IEC) activities,  provision  of public  goods  such as safe
water or sanitation  services  are examples  of such initiatives. These can be incorporated  into the analysis
by modifying  equation I in the following  way:
maximize  L  =  [  (L,'(D,'(P,',Pv,F))- I  + LV(DV(P 1
3,P1",I,F), F) + 
PiBJI,F
subject to:  S  (C1'  p-)  * Dt'(P',P,)  . + C(F)  . R15 -
The direct investment,  F, enters the equation in at least four possible places.  First, there is the direct
improvement on health from the intervention.  Cases of malaria avoided by killing mosquitoes, for
example,  translates into a direct health benefit through the function  L(F).  Second, the number  of cases
of a disease avoided will translate into the demand for health services in both the public and private
sectors. This translation  need not be one for one, that is, some people  may suffer (and possibly  die) from
a disease without ever seeking help and so the number of cases avoided need not be the same as the
reduction in the number  of people  seeking  help. Certain kinds  of interventions  may have no direct effect
on disease  but operate by increasing  the demand  for services. For example,  public information  campaigns
which make mothers more aware of symptoms  of disease  and more prone to seek help for them has no
direct health impact  but will increase  the demand  for services  (public  or private). Stimulating  demand  for
preventive  care such as immunization  would  be another example. Third, information  campaigns  directed
toward private providers can improve  treatment currently given in the private sector (for an example  of
this  in the context of  improving drug prescription accuracy, see Hammer (1992)).  Finally, the
intervention  will entail a cost C(F).  For many of the clinical interventions,  the costs attached to the
provision of  service could be  assumed constant without much problem.  However, when direct,
population  based interventions  are considered,  the cost structure can  be very important. Large fixed  start
up costs for pest control operations  or information  campaigns  could  generate decreasing costs.  On the
other hand, costs of successfully  reaching harder and harder (or more and more remote and sparsely
settled) groups within a population  with health information  or water networks could lead to increasing
costs.
The basic results of including  direct interventions  are:
- Preventing health problems for which there is effective  care is less valuable than preventing
problems with no solution (net benefits of direct interventions  need to subtract out the health
benefits of effective  clinical care whether  in the public or the private sectors.). Conversely, the
degree of subsidy and the decision to treat an illness can be influenced  by the existence of
effective primary prevention. The direction  of this effect is not obvious, however. The use of
funds for primary 1p  ,,iention will make the budget constraint  bind more tightly and will knock
some diseases off the treatable list. On the other hand, effective  prevention may make treating
any remaining  cases less burdensome.- 16 -
- Preventive activities are more valuable  when care for the conditions they prevent is heavily
subsidized.
-Public  health investments  can change  the appropriate  pricing and rationing rules for health care
delivery.  Improviag  the quality of private care may obviate the need to provide free public care
for the same condition. Improvement  in the sorting of patients  by disease conditions  (in the case
of uniform user fees) may allow a higher fee and a greater range of services to be provided.
- Information campaigns  which increase the demand for effective services in the private sector
(relative io subsidized  services in the public sector) are to be preferred to those which increase
public demands.
The last proposition  is particularly  sensitive  to the initial  statement  of the problem in which it is
only overall  health outcomes  and the public  budget  which concerns  the relevant  policy  maker (the minister
of health).  In the following  section in which welfare is considered,  other, less appealing  aspects of the
private market may modify this result.
3.  Welfare as the Objective
The argument up to this point was based on the assumption  that it is only health outcomes  and
only the budget of the Ministry of Health which matters in public decision  making. This position  is not
tenable in a number of ways. Consider the following  proposed investment: there is already a network
of public health facilities (and no private sector). Everyone  goes to a clinic  when they are ill. However,
some people who live far from the closest clinic  have to expend much money and foregone earnings  to
get there.  The ministry is considering  adding one clinic in a particularly remote area which would
decrease the travel time significantly  for many  people (travel time worth much more than the cost of the
facility)  but would  not improve  health at all (everyone  already gets needed  treatment). Should  the facility
be built? The decision  rule implicit  in the analysis  above  would answer  unequivocally  "no" since  no extra
health is obtained from the scarce public health budget.  From society's point of view, however, the
answer is certainly  yes since, as assumed,  the costs saved from reduced travel time and money  is greater- 17 -
than the cost of the facility.  The problem is that the total costs to society are not captured in the
Ministry's budget alone.
A second type of problem is with promoting private care.  When health status is the only
objective, a price or rationing change which pushed people into a private sector which was medically
equivalent  to the public was good since there would be no sacrifice of health status while saving on the
government  budget.  If, however, the private sector was not characterized  by normal  competitive  behavior
but tended to give too much care (due, for example,  to doctors' financial incentives  in a fee-for-service
system) this would entail too great a sacrifice, socially, for the amount of improvement  in health the
service brings.  Again, the problem is that only some costs of the system are included in the problem.
Related: even if care was equivalent  in the two sectors, private providers (due to some monopoly  power)
may charge high prices and an undesireable  transfer from poorer to richer people would result.  The
common feature is that there are aspects of the private sector, not related to health promotion per se,
which may be undesireable  from the perspective  of welfare improvement.
A third type of problem, mentioned  briefly in the preceding  section, is that in the rationing  rules
described above, too much depends on the value of X. This term is the implicit value of life based on
the arbitrary degree of funding (R in equation 1) in the public sector. The problem rules out expenditures
on health people may be willing  to make for themselves  when  there own valuations  of health differ from
that implicit in X.
The first two problems could be handled by changing the budget constraint in equation 1 to
include all costs horne by everyone  in the system before  and after the intervention. This would  still leave
the problem of satisfying people's own valuations of health benefits unsettled.  An alternative  is to
change  the objective  of the problem to include  all benefits, monetary  or health-based,  and all costs borne
by the society in the original problem. While this sounds  like a much harder  problem than that involving
health alone, it is the basis of the project evaluation  literature and does not need to be rederived here.
There are a few issues involved in interpreting this literature for the health sector which are worth
discussing.
The literature on the welfare economics  of policy reform and project evaluation  (see Boadway- 18 -
(1975), Dreze and Stern (1989),  Squire (1989)  and Kanbur  (1991))  identifies  conditions  in which welfare
is improved  either as a result of policy reform (changes  in prices essentially,  though other reforms can
be interpreted  in this way) or as a result of a direct investment. For use in the evaluation  of investments,
the method  determines  the appropriate  prices (or the "shadow"  prices)  to be used to value the outputs  and
inputs of the investment. If the investment  makes a profit at these prices, it will lead to an increase in
social welfare and should be done.  It is the calculation  of these prices which allows for the difference
between investments  justified for social  purposes  rather than for private  profit. If all of these  prices were
the same as those facing the private sector in a laissez faire world, there would be little justification  for
public investment. However, many characteristics  of health sector lead to a divergence  between  public
and private values. Applications  in the health field need to keep the following  features in mind.
First, while  much of the literature  on project evaluation  was motivated  by the need to correct for
policy induced  distortions, the distortions  which  justify an investment  or policy reform in health are not
primarily due to taxes. There are true market failures  which require  government  intervention. For some
health related items such as treatment of communicable  disease, the social value of consuming  the good
will be greater than the private value since people cannot  be expected  to take the risk of infecting  others
into account when evaluating the need for treatment.  Increases in the consumption  of such goods,
whether by policy changes (say, by subsidizing  treatment)  or by direct investment  (providing  subsidized
treatment or, in some cases, vaccination)  will be evaluated  at a premium over the private price of the
service. In the case of pure public goods, or those cases in which no private market can exist  due to the
inability  to exclude any non-paying  user (vector control, some water supply problems),  the whole value
of the investment  is attributable  to the public intervention. An argument could be made (see appendix
3) that direct investments  by the government  should  be done only if the correction  of market failures and
other distortions  is necessary  for the project to turn a profit.
Other market failures commonly  associated  with the health sector revolve around the problem of
imperfect  information. Here some difficult  conceptual  issues  could  arise but the main problem is that the
"true" value of the commodity  may not he perceived  by people due to general lack of knowledge  of the
effectiveness  of treatment or the consequences  of lack of treatment. People are frequently assumed  to
undervalue  the benefits  of preventive  activities (immunizations,  life-style  changes including  cessation  of
smoking). This would yield a social value greater than the perceived private value.  How this value is- 19  -
determined is a major question, both in principle and in actual measurement. As far as the principle
goes, the value needs to capture the effect of providing  the consumer  with more complete  information.
The value would be the marginal benefit under this better set of  information.  Certain kinds of
information  are known  to medical  professionals  such as the change  in the probability  of disease  incidence
with and without vaccination  or the kinds and degrees of health improvements  which may be expected
from alternative  treatments. Other kinds of information  are known  to the patient, such as tolerance  for
pain or uncertainty  of outcome  or burdens put on family members due to disability,  death or financial
cost. The appropriate  information  set to consider  is the combination  of personal  situation  and preferences
on the one hand and professional  knowledge  on the other.  Practically speaking, there could be two
different ways of handling  this problem. One would be to try to approximate  the social value of a service
under the augmented  information  set by 1) guessing (or doing research into) how many more people
would use a given service if they were fully informed  of the consequences  of using it 2) determining  the
elasticity of demand for the service (either using demand  studies for the service under the status quo or
using studies from better informed  (better educated?)  populations  or subpopulatiotis  within  the same area
and 3) inferring how much  higher the price under the new demand  curve would  be at the old, status quo,
level of demand. Alternatively, an explicit valuation  of the service under the new information  could  be
avoided by allowing  there to be more than one dimension  of valuation  for the project giving the decision
maker the freedom of using different weighting  systems between them.  Monetary changes (or things
which may be easily converted into monetary  values) could be added up in one dimension  with various
sorts of health outcomes left in a separate account.
Finally, social and private price may diverge indirectly  due to the lack of information  on the part
of consumers  as a result of having  to rely on medical  professionals  to suggest  treatment. This "principal-
agent" problem revolves around the problem  that medical  professionals  may have incentives  to provide
care which are different froii  those that would be chosen by a perfectly informed consumer.  This
problem, identified 30 years ago by Arrow (1963), is at the core of attempts to model behavior in
markets for medical care.  A number of researchers (Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1991), Selden (1990),
Pauly (1988))have  advanced  models of this phenomenon  though there is little consensus  as to the most
salient features to  include or  how these models might best be  adapted to the conditions faced in
developing  countries.  The often mentioned  "supplier  induced demand"  problem may be thought  of in
these terms. This is the hypothesis  that an increase in the supply of doctors may not reduce the price of- 20 -
medical services as the providers induce more, and more expensive, procedures in order to maintain
income (Evans (1974)).  They can get away with this since consumers are not in a position to second
guess  the professional. Here, again, the "true" value  of a service to the consumer  differs from the supply
price due to the decision making of an agent, probably with different values and motives than that of
satisfying  the consumer.
Second, health sern.ces are almost always non-traded  goods, i.e., as services  they are provided
and used in the same place as opposed  to ordinary commodities  which can be sent.  This distinction  is
important  because the proper output to value is the net addition  to consumption  of an item, that is, net
of adjustments  of the market for the service that already exists. This is exactly  the same as the result in
the analysis  of health outcomes  discussed  above. The only thing that should be valued are net additions
above  what the market will supply. An essential  piece  of empirical  information  then, in evaluating  public
investment  in the health sector is the change in demand, supply and the market equilibrium  that in the
private sector that results from that investment. This would be true even if all medical markets were
competitive  simply due to the nature of non-traded  goods.  When combined  with the argument of the
preceding  paragraph,  that the markets  have non-competitive  characteristics  (in ways  which go beyond  the
standard  non-competitive  models  of markets),  the need  for convincing  models  of behavior  takes on central
importance.
Third, the approach outlined in appendix three is quite flexible in the type of outcomes and
policies which can be evaluated. On the outcome  side, the welfare measure  does not have to be a single,
money  valued number but can be defined  as a list of different types of outcomes:  money, lives saved (or
other health measure)  or any other kind of outcome  which is not easily converted into a single standard.
The income (or health effects, for that matter) of different income groups could be one such set of
outcomes  though there are a number of ways in which different weights  could be placed on the separate
incomes  (at least) in order to obtain an aggregate  measure  of welfare  (see Squire (1989)  on distributional
weights in project evaluation).- 21 -
4.  Conclusions
This paper attempted  to derive price and rationing rules for public health facilities. The effect
on these rules of different assumptions  concerning the objectives  of government (i.e.,  health versus
welfare), the limitations  on available  policy instruments  and the market environment  in which the public
system operates was highlighted.
One recurrent finding is that policy reform needs to be assessed in relation to the changes it
induces relative to the status quo before reform.  While an obvious  point, it identifies  a distinct gap in
the literature on resource allocation in health.  In order to assess changes, the behavior  of the private
sector needs to be known both in terms of the type of care which is given in a system and in terms of
how this care will change  as a response  to the policy itself. SuDstituting  for a reasonably  well functioning
private sector is not as valuable as providing services which a private sector cannot be expected  to
sustain. Research is needed into the characterization  of market equilibrium for medical care and its
response  to policy measures. Many issues  could not be examined  here, the most important  being those
related to uncertainty  and insurance. If the research called for in this paper is pursued, however, these
issues will have to figure prominently  as a major determinant  for the demand for care. There is still a
long way to go since this need was originally  identified  by Arrow.
The analysis  here is not done in terms of "preventive"  or "curative" care and argues for the
assessment  of interventions  on the basis of changes  in the stated objectives  of a public system. However,
there could well be a connection  with the preventive/curative  dichotomy  if there were reason to believe
that preventive  care will systematically  lose out to curative  in a market setting. On the basis of people's
generally  acknowledged  undervaluation  of preventive  services  this may well  be the case. Other prevention
activities also have many "public  good" features with few private alternatives  and will look good when
improvements  over status quo are examined  for all interventions. However, all activities need to be
evaluated  in terms  of their improvement  over market provision  and it is not necessary  to prejudge  the case
for certain types of intervention.- 22 -
Apperdix 1- Solution  with Disease-Specific  Charges
The maximization  problem in equation 1 requires simultaneously  solving two sets of first order
conditions.
For prices:
aL  at{DI  WI  IB  cPV],d  Div  aPiv =  L,  +  a_.  *I.  +  L.  +_.
apj8  ap  apiv  apf  ap8l  apiv  apil
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where: Li  =  marginal health improvement  resulting from a visit to sector j  (B=  Public, V  =
Private) for condition i
X  = the Lagrange multiplier for the budget  constraint  of the Ministry
a  = change in the private sector price for condition  i with respect to a change in
the public sector price
For indicator  variables we need to evaluate  the change  in the objective  function with a (discrete)  change
in the inclusion  of a treatment:
AL = LiB(DJB(piBA'IP,.I,))  + Lv(Dv(pv  .,p'1))
- Lv(Dv(P,%I, 4 ,OO))  - %((C,B-PW).D,8(Pi  Pv,v. 1))
(A1.2)- 23 -
where: POV=  ,.,  the price charged  by the private sector when a service is (1,=  1) or is not  =
0) offered by the public sector
In the optimal allocation, a treatment should be given if this expression is positive.  The objective
function (health status plus a term reflecting  the budget  constraint)  will increase with a new treatment if
the improvement  in health resulting from extra demand for services in the public sector n. of any
reduction in the private sector L is greater than a term which reflects the extra cost to the system of
providing the service. This extra cost will be higher, the "tighter" is the budget constraint  faced by the
public health service, reflected  in higher values  of the term X.
Rearranging terms to solve for optimal  prices:
,D,_  (ejC - Y  + Lv ef  )
(A1.3)
where e" is the elasticity of demand for public service i with private prices changing  as a result of the
change in the public  price, and ev is the cross price elasticity  of demand  for private care again with price
changing  in the new equilibrium.
This price equation corresponds  to a rationing rule of:
a  a  v  V  VV Li (Di QIj=  1)) + Li (Di  (D=l))  -L,V(D (l5=O))  >
(C,-Pi)-D10  i
(A1.4)
where to simplify  notation, demand is written as a function  of the indicator  variable, that is, with prices
(not presented) allowed to reflect whether the service is provided  in the public sector.- 24  -
The expression for the optimal  price (Al.3) indicates,  first of all,  that the price charged for a
service will be such that demand for the service is elastic (e  <  -1) as is the case with all monopoly
pricing models. Given this condition,  prices will be higher:
1) the less elastic is the demand  for the service. The higher the elasticity  of demand for a service
(ignoring for the moment its health effects), the more is the sacrifice in earnings (given that
elasticities are all high) from further raising the price.  Therefore, the services which are
relatively more elastic will have lower prices (higher  subsidies)  at the optimum.
2) the smaller is the health consequence  of raising  the price in the public sector. The second  term
in equation A1.3 reflects the health impact  (evaluated  in money  terms by the multiplier A) of a
price rise.  The term involving  superscripts B is the direct discouragement  of treatment in the
public sector, the term involving the V's  reflects the offset to this effect due to increases in
demand in the private sector.  The extent of this offset is captured by the cross-price  elasticity.
The greater the net reduction in the health status of the population  due to a price increase for a
particular service, the lower the price for that service.
3) the more binding the budget constraint, that is, the higher is A.  As the term A incruases
(which would happen if the budget R, were cut),  the second term in A1.3 will decrease in
absolute value.  Since this term represents the amount by which prices will be discounted in
pursuit of better health, a decrease raises the price.
For the rationing rule, the left hand side of A1.4 can be interpreted  as the net improvement  in
health due to offering a service per unit of subsidy  to the public sector.  The numerator is the health
impact  due to the direct provision of services, the L,"'s, net of the offset of (presumably)  lower use of
private services, (the difference in use, Lv, with and without  competition  from the public sector). The
denominator  is the net cost of providing  the service at (simultaneously  determined)  prices Pi, or, the per
unit costs (C; - P) times the demand  in the public sector. This ratio, which  represents  health improvement
per unit subsidy, is to be compared to A, the implicit value of health or, the amount of health status
improvement  which would result in a unit increase in the budget  allocation, R.  Only conditions  having- 25 -
ratios of benefit per unit subsidy higher than this should be treated.
For both the pricing and the rationing rule, there is a little sleignt of hand going on here in the
way in which the private sector prices are being handled. The elasticities  in the price equation as well
as the levels of demand in both sectors with and without public provision all depend on the prices
determined by the  private market equilibrium  associated  with the public price and rationing decisions.
We don't know much  about  these markets  and their response  to public  policy. This indicates  an important
set of questions  for research.  In the current context, lowering a price in the public sector could induce
competitive  price falls in the private sector (especially  if the original private price was not determined
by competitive  cost considerations  and, thus, included  excess profits). The accompanying  price fall may
limit both the number of people who leave the private sector and (not surprisingly)  come to the public
sector.  If the two sectors are equally competent  technically,  this means a lower cross price elasticity  of
demand  for the private sector and would  be reflected  in both a lower optimal  price and a higher likelihood
of inclusion  in the public sector.- 26 -
Appendix  2- Simpliflcations  and Extensions
Free Public Provision
If no prices can be charged in public facilities, then the pricing rule, obviously, is no longer
relevant and the rationing rule is modified  only slightly  to become:
L,B(DjB( 1,=1)) + L1V(D,v( 1 ,=1))-L 4v(D v(l=O)))
C, D,B  <
(A2.  1)
The differences  in interpretation  between the case with individual  prices and this are:
- the rationing rule now compares  net health benefits  to actual resource costs, C,, rather than to
subsidy  costs, (Ci -Pi)
- the rationing rule has real "bite" in the sense that some services  will certainly not be provided
since their prices cannot be arbitrarily  raised to match small health benefits with small subsidy
costs; subsidy costs are technologically  determined  (given  zero price) rather than determined  as
part of the solution.
If, in addition to free care, the technology  of curative care is linear in cases seen (or, L(D1)  =
L,- Di) the rationing rule becomes:
Le  Lv  Dt(l=j)-DIVl§o




which ignores any effect of the relative size of the public and private sectors (probably not a bad
assumption  for people who have already shown up for treatment. There could be scale effects due to
differential severity of health problems if for some conditions  people are nearly indifferent  between
seeking  or not seeking  treatment and less severe cases are seen when prices are low. This effect would
have less to do with the public/private  split, though, than with the treatment/non-treatment  split).
If, in addition to free care and linear technology,  there is either 1) no private sector (Dv - 0 for
all i) or 2) a useless private sector (i.e., one that can generate no improvement  in health status:L,v  - 0
for all i) or 3) there is no cross price elasticity  of demand at all between  public and private sectors (in
the sense that private demand for services  is completely  unaffected  by whether  or not services  are offered




This is the rationing rule associated with standard cost effectiveness  analysis of curative care options
where  the health improvement  associated  with a technology  is divided  by its resource  cost (not the subsidy
component only because of the assumption of free care) and this ratio is higher for any  included
procedure than for any excluded one.- 28 -
Uniform User Fees
If equation 1 is solved with the restriction  that all prices charged  in the public clinic must be the
same, the common  price will be:
1  (cov(LI,1 r  )  + COV(L 1 ,ijl)  + L,  iB  + L 1V 1)+COV(c 1
5
3 tj)  + c  B
B  -1
(A2.4)
where: O=  '  ,  = the share of public visits accounted  for by condition i
B 
n=  el=  the elasticity of demand for public visits for condition i
weighted  by the fraction  of visits accounted  for by this condition.
The sum of these terms is the elasticity  of demand  for all public
visits.
v  ,  v
Tit ev,6O4  =  the cross price elasticity of demand for private care for condition i
with respect  to the price of care in the public sector weighted  by the ratio
of private sector visits for this condition  to total public sector visits
X  = the mean of X
Ignoring the covariance  terms for a moment,  this expression is very similar to the one in which
each price may be  chosen separately.  Where individual elasticities and cross elasticities appear in
equation A1.3, they are replaced by the equivalent weighted  average of all elasticities  in A2.4.  The
health care system is being treated as a whole in the derivation  of the optimal  common  price.  The basic- 29 -
results are equivalent  to the results in appendix 1, that the common  price should be: higher the lower is
the overall elasticity  of demand for public  service, higher the closer the private sector substitutes  for the
public both in quality of care (LIB  versus LJV)  and, behaviorally,  in the cross price elasticity of demand.
The terms representing  the covariances  between  elasticities  and effectiveness  or costs modify  the
basic results by reflecting  the fact that price increases  will have different effects on different categories
of care.  Higher (negative)  covariances  between demand  for public visits and the effectiveness  of care
in the public sector means that the demands  which would be most discouraged  by higher prices are also
those for which treatments are most effective. In that case, the optimal  price would  be lower than when
the more price sensitive  treatments are less effective  in a technical  sense.
Population  based interventions
Equation 1 can be modified  to take into account  a policy  which can directly  influence  health status
and/or demand for health services through means other than price or rationing.  This can be either
because preventive activities reduce the demand for care or that health education and promotion can
increase demand. The modification requires the addition of the intervention F both in the demand
functions  and in health status itself. The additional  first order condition  to determine  the appropriate  level
of the public health intervention  is:
C1f(e '  ls-A  j  +)Lj  D  +  ) +  + D(C.  P)dF
x  aDi  F  aV  O9  F  a  a
(A2.5)
This indicates  that the marginal  cost of provision should be set equal to the benefit due to health
improvement  (represented  by the term multiplied  by the conversion  factor 1/X)  and due to budget  savings.
The health benefits are composed  of two types of effects. The expression  -aLF  captures  any direct health
benefit from the investment  itself. An example  of F in this case would  be vector control or any primary30 -
prevention activity done by the ministry. The expression D, .-  reflects any improvement in the
effectiveness  of the private sector as a result of the investment.  An example  would be IEC (information,
education  and communication)  activities  directed  at private providers. Against  these direct improvements
in health status must be counted  the health improvement  for the cases which could  have been handled  by
the curative care system had the people become ill and sought treatment. The terms involving a  Ds
and their equivalent  for the private sector are negative  since the effect of prevention, say, on demand  for
services should  be negative. Prevention  of diseases in which effective  curative  care is being used is less
important  than prevention  of diseases  with no cure. However,  the existence  of curative  care is irrelevant
if people are not using it and therefore, the offset to the health effects of the prevention activity only
comes from that part of the reduced incidence  which is reflected in the reduction of demand for care.
Those who never sought care to begin with still reap the benefits.  The budgetary benefits for the
Ministry are captured in the last term in expression  A2.5. Prevention is beneficial  to the extent that it
saves the Ministry its subsidy  to services.
The existence of public health interventions  can change the optimal pattern of subsidies and
services provided though there is no general rule concerning what these changes will be.  Direct
investments  may lead to a disease condition either appearing or disappearing from the list of treated
illnesses. For the cases where the rationing  rule has real effects  (free care or uniforn fees) the inclusion
of direct investments  can drive some activities  out of the list since the budget constraint  will bind more
tightly and the cutoff level of effect, X, will rise.  The same would  happen, of course, if the investment
led to the actual eradication  of the disease. Alternatively,  reducing the demand for a particular type of
treatment  to a low level may make it worthwhile  to promise  since  the budgetary  impact  will be much less
(the  denominator  in expression  A2. 1 or A2.4 will  be lower). In the case of disease-specific  charges, this
would show up as a possibly higher subsidy rate on treating the residual cases of the disease.  There
could also be impact  on the pattern of own and cross price elasticities  if the people who are most affected
by the control  activities  (say, remote  rural dwellers)  vary systematically  from others in the sector in which
they seek treatment or the way in which they respond to prices. For example, if demand for public
services in the remote areas is more inelastic (since  fees may be a smaller fraction of the total cost of- 31 -
seeking treatment due to transport and time costs), market demand elasticity will rise.  The control
activities can change the market level elasticities  of demand for treatment and therefore the appropriate
price and rationing rule for those treatments.- 32 -
Agpendix  3-  Welfare  changes  from policies and projects
The underlying  problem  discussed  in section  2. in the text is described  in Boadway  (1975),  Squire
(1989) and Kanbur (1991) and sets out the problem  of improving  the level of welfare of a society either
by policy reform or by direct investment  in productive activities  (a "project"). Here we use the notation
in Kanbur and note that a change in welfare  can be written:
dW  =(t.-A.E-1.-d  +(  'AE
(aX  ap  (  aX 
(A3.1)
where: W =  measure of welfare
q =  a vector of consumer  prices (marginal  benefit) of a commodity
p =  a vector of producer  prices (marginal  private cost) of a commodity
t  - q-p or, the "distortion"  of prices in the economy
x  =  a vector of levels of consumption  of each commodity
y  =  a vector of production  levels of each commodity
E =  the matrix of elasticities  of net demands
z =  the vector of net inputs and outputs associated  with a project
Note that both policy reform, dt, and direct project investment,  dz, are justified on the part of
the government  by the existence  of the distortions,  t.  This is obvious for the case of policy reform from
the first term in the expression since there could  be no improvement  in welfare from any change in t if
all distortions were originally zero.  On the project evaluation  side, it is less obvious since the term
describing  the welfare change due to projects (dz) is composed  of two parts.  The second term in the
shadow  price calculation  is the "distortion  correcting"  component  of the valuation. Investments  receive
a premium in the calculation  if they lead to an expansion  of consumption  of goods with higher social
valuation  than private.  The first term, p, is the actual private resource cost.  If there are no distortions
in the system, the value of a project would be: p'dz.
This argument seems to indicate  that an increase in welfare would result from a public project
if it would turn a profit at private prices and could therefore be justified.  However, this raises some- 33 -
questions  as to the source  of projects  for evaluation.  The usual,  zero  profit condition  for competitive
equilibrium  would  be (in the current  notation):  p'dz=0.  This indicates  that, in the absence  of any
distortions  (policy  induced  or a result  of private  market  failure), while  the condition  of turning  a profit
by government  is sufficient  to justify  an investment,  such  an investment  is not likely  to be found. On
the ollicr  hand,  as Hammond  (1990)  says, "[those],  with  more  open  minds,  will  at least  wi  -.  .o  consider
the possibility  of there  being  some  desirable  projects  which  private  sector  corporations  and  entrepreneurs
have  overlooked."  However,  it is not  clear  that, even  if the government  were  to identify  such  a project,
it will  actually  want to do things  which  are viable  at private  prices. An alternative  would  be simply  to
provide  the information  that profit making  opportunities  exist. If no one in the private  sector takes
advantage  of the information,  one might  wonder  if there are, in fact, distortions  in the capital  markets,
say, which  prevent  the investment  or, that  it just isn't so certain  that  the calculation  was correct.  When
there Mn  distortions  to be corrected,  the  role for  public  involvement  is clear  and  the  reason  for the  project
not being  undertaken  is less  mysterious.
In the usual  description  of this  problem,  the "distortions"  associated  with  the  problem  are policy
induced  taxes  (hence  the mnemonic  "t") which  drive  a wedge  between  producer  and consumer  prices.
In the case  of the health  sector,  however,  these  are as likely  to be due to market  imperfections  in the
private  sector  as policy  induced.  The specific  forms  of the distortions  in the health  sector  are described
in the text. For the cases  in which  the market  failure  is due to non-competitive  elements  of the market
for medical  care, both the wedge  between  social and private values, t,  and the response  of net
consumption  of all commodities  to both policies  and investments,  E, a model  of private market
equilibrium  is necessary.- 34 -
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